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I. INTRODUCTION
In HCSC-Laundry v. United States' the United States Supreme Court
resolved for the moment the longstanding dispute between the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) and the nonprofit hospital industry over the tax-exempt
status of hospital service organizations (HSOs). Petitioner HCSC-Laundry, a
nonprofit corporation organized to provide laundry and linen services exclu-
sively to fifteen nonprofit hospitals and to an ambulance service, had sought
exemption from federal income taxation under Internal Revenue Code section
50 l(c)(3).2 In affirming the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's denial of
exemption,3 the Court held in a per curiam decision4 that section 501(e)5 was
1. 450 U.S. 1 (1981).
2. I.R.C. § 501 in pertinent part reads:
(a) Exemption from taxation
An organization described in subsection (c)... shall be exempt from taxation unless such exemp-
tion is denied under section 502 or 503.
(c) List of exempt organizations
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific ... purposes .... no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation ....
and which does not participate in, or intervene in .... any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.
3. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428 (3rd Cir. 1980), rev'g 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
4. Justice White dissented without opinion, noting, however, that he would have granted certiorari and
heard argument. Justice Stevens dissented with a vigorous opinion.
5. I.R.C. § 501(e) provides:
For purposes of this title, an organization shall be treated as an organization organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes, if-
(1) such organization is organized and operated solely-
(A) to perform on a centralized basis, one or more of the following services which, if per-
formed on its own behalf by a hospital which is an organization described in subsection (c)(3) and
exempt from taxation under subsection (a), would constitute activities in exercising or performing
the purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption: data processing, purchasing,
warehousing, billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial engineering, laboratory, printing,
communications, record center, and personnel (including selection, testing, training, and educa-
tion of personnel) services; and
(B) to perform such services solely for two or more hospitals each of which is-
(i) an organization described in subsection (c)(3) which is exempt from taxation under
subsection (a),
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the exclusive means by which HSOs could obtain tax-exempt status. Because
laundry and linen services are not among the services enumerated in section
501(e)(1)(A), 6 the Court concluded that HCSC-Laundry was not entitled to
tax-exempt status.
The dispute over the tax-exempt status of HSOs began in the mid-1950s
when the IRS ruled 7 that if two or more tax-exempt hospitals created an entity
to perform commercial services exclusively for them, that entity was a
"feeder organization" 8 as defined by the predecessor to section 5029 and
therefore not exempt. The IRS interpretation of the feeder organization pro-
vision was immediately challenged, and in 1958 the Court of Claims rejected
the conclusion of the IRS in Hospital Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc. v.
United States.'o
The IRS, however, refused to alter its position. Finally, in response to
compelling policy considerations favoring the encouragement of HSOs as a
means of curbing the inflationary rise in health care costs, Congress in 1968
amended section 501 to add a new subsection (e)" dealing specifically with
HSOs. However, because of the purposeful omission of laundry services from
the new subsection, the amendment did not remedy the uncertainty of the
law. HSOs-particularly those that performed laundry services-continued
to press for exemption under section 501(c)(3) by taking advantage of the
Hospital Bureau decision and Congress' ambiguous treatment in section
50 1(e) of the entire issue of HSO exemption. The IRS, meanwhile, maintained
its earlier interpretation of section 502 and construed the half-measure
amendment of section 501 as congressional approval of its position.
The IRS argument was that, in view of its reading of section 502 as it
related to HSOs, section 501(e) was the exclusive means by which HSOs that
(ii) a constituent part of an organization described in subsection (c)(3) which is exempt
from taxation under subsection (a) and which, if organized and operated as a separate entity,
would constitute an organization described in subsection (c)(3), or
(iii) owned and operated by the United States, a State, the District of Columbia, or a
possession of the United States, or a political subdivision or any agency or instrumentality of
any of the foregoing;
(2) such organization is organized and operated on a cooperative basis and allocates or pays,
within 8V/ months after the close of its taxable year, all net earnings to patrons on the basis of
services performed for them; and
(3) if such organization has capital stock, all of such stock outstanding is owned by its
patrons.
For purposes of this title, any organization which, by reason of the preceding sentence, is an
organization described in subsection (c)(3) and exempt from taxation under subsection (a), shall be
treated as a hospital and as an organization referred to in section 170(b)(l)(A)(iii).
6. For the enumeration of services, see I.R.C. § 501(e)(I)(A), quoted in note 5 supra.
7. Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 C.B. 127.
8. See text accompanying notes 69-81 infra.
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 101(b) (now I.R.C. § 502). Section 502(a) provides: "'An organization
operated for the primary purposes of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall not be exempt from taxation
under section 501 on the ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more organizations exempt from
taxation under section 501.'"
10. 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
l1. Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 109, 82 Stat. 269, 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(e) (1968). See note 5 supra.
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met its requirements could obtain tax-exempt status. 12 This position soon
came under attack by courts and commentators alike. Indeed, until 1980,
every federal court that had heard the issue had decided against the IRS and in
favor of the view that HSOs could qualify for exemption under either section
501(c)(3) or section 501(e). 13 These decisions allowed HSOs that engaged in
activities not covered by section 501(e) and those that engaged in enumerated
services but nonetheless desired greater flexibility to seek exemption directly
under section 501(c)(3) as charitable organizations.
In 1980 this favorable trend came to an abrupt halt. Three courts of
appeals 14 and the Tax Court' 5 ruled in favor of the IRS and against exemption
for HSOs under section 501(c)(3). By its holding in HCSC-Laundry the Court
has given the final imprimatur of validity to the position to which the IRS has
so resolutely clung. In doing so, the Court has rewarded persistence but
ignored policy.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
A. Why Tax-Exempt Status?
1. The Policy Considerations Behind the Encouragement
of Hospital Service Organizations
As the health care system in the United States consumes growing propor-
tions of our national resources, pressures increase to adopt and implement
effective strategies of cost reduction or containment.16 The need for such
12. See Rev. Rul. 69-633. 1%9-2 C.B. 121; Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 C.B. 147. See also text accompanying
notes 97-99 infra.
13. Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1979); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 473 F.
Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428 (3rd Cir. 1980), afl'd, 450 U.S. 1(1981); Metropolitan Detroit Area
Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1979), rev'd, 634 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1980);
Community Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9300 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Hospital
Cent. Servs. Ass'n v. United States. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. Ir 9601 (W.D. Wash. 1977), rev'd per curiam, 623
F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); United Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 384 F.
Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974); Northern Cal. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Hospital Bur. Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
14. Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1980); Hospital
Cent. Servs. Ass'n v. United States, 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); HCSC-
Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'd. 450 U.S. (1981).
15. Associated Hosp. Servs.. Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213 (1980).
16. See D. BARRETT. MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as D. BARRETI]; Robins,
Controlling Health Care Costs, in HEALTH SERVICES 215 (1977) (proceedings of The Academy of Political
Science). On the consumer side, health care expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) have
more than doubled, from 4.5% in 1950 to 9.4% in 1980. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept. 1981, at 1, 3. The proportion ofGNP consumed by health care may reach 10% in
1983. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1422 n. 11 (1980). Fora
further discussion of the increasing costs of health care, see generally MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS (M. Brown &
M. McCool eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS].
One commentator has noted that the pressures to contain costs will come from many sources:
During the 1980s, tax-exempt hospitals will be under increased pressure to reduce costs and to
maximize existing sources while developing new revenue sources to meet current and future operating
and capital requirements.
This pressure will come from a variety of sources. Inflation, the aging-population increases,
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strategies in the hospital industry is acute; for example, in 1980, 40.3 percent
of personal health care expenditures were spent for hospital care, compared
with 18.9 percent for physicians' services.17
The hospital industry, however, faces significant disincentives to any
effort to reduce or contain costs. A majority of hospitals in the United States
are nonprofit 8 and therefore are not as responsive to the competitive and
cost-reductive pressures of the market place as are their profit-maximizing
counterparts.' 9 A further disincentive is presented by the unique position the
federal government occupies in relation to the hospital industry and the health
care system in general. Because of its status as a major third party payor of
health care expenditures, the federal government has a significant impact on
the cost and quality of health care. The presence of such cost-based re-
imbursements reduces or, at best, neutralizes the incentive for hospitals ac-
tively to reduce costs: "Providers of care who are paid under cost-based
reimbursement of fee-for-service mechanisms have less incentive to provide
'cost-effective' care because of a general lack of price competition." ' 0
Consequently, representatives of government and of the health care sys-
tem have advocated institutional and structural reform of the nonprofit hos-
pital industry as one means of reducing the cost of health care.2' Hospitals
have responded by cooperating on a multi-institutional basis to provide both
population shifts and the high cost of new technology are significant as non-governmental pressures.
Governmental pressures will increase as new restrictions and limitations are placed on the ability
of hospitals to recover the full cost of providing services under cost-based reimbursement programs.
State rate-setting and rate review agencies will contribute by using their broad powers to deprive
hospitals of the ability to increase rates to offset increased costs.
D. Mancino, Avoiding the pitfalls-New revenue sources and.tax-exempt status, HOSPITAL FIN. MAN-
AGEMENT, May 1981, at 46.
17. Gibson & Waldo, National HealthExpenditures, 1980, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept. 1981, at 1,3.
18. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HEALTH UNITED STATES 349 (1978); Sloan &
Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Inputs, 23 (. L. & ECON. 81 (1980).
19. Allalouf, Letting Market Forces Help Govern Provision of Health Care, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, § A,
at 19, col. 4. See note 20 infra; Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1416, 1459-62 (1980); Sloan & Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Inputs, 23 J. L. & ECON.
81 passim. (1980).
20. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept. 1981, at 1, 10.
See also Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry? 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1426-30 (1980) In
1980, the federal government spent $70.9 billion on health care, or approximately 68% of total public expendi-
tures. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures 1980, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept. 1981, at 1, 18
(table 1). Gibson and Waldo write:
The health care market is atypical of the perfect market for goods and services envisioned by
standard economic theory. More than any other market, it is dominated by third-party payers, that is,
by persons or organizations who purchase care on behalf of those who consume it. In 1980, two-thirds
of personal health care expenditures were made by the government or by private health insurance. To
that extent, consumers of health care tend to be isolated from the true price of health care and tend to
consume more care than they would were they to pay directly the full price of the goods and services
they receive.
Id. at 1I. See also McNerney, Control of Health-Care Costs in 1980's, 303 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1088, 1089
(1980).
21. See generally MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 1. The nation's largest private health-care
philanthropic organization, the Robert Johnson Foundation, has changed its policy focus from facilitating
patient access to medical services to the development of strategies to combat the increasing costs of medical
care. Foundation to Seek Methods to Reduce Medical Costs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1981, § A, at 13, col. I.
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operational or administrative services and health care.22 The popularity of and
need for such multi-institutional arrangements is clear:
Because there is a limit to volume and revenue potential, hospitals must
develop survival strategies that enable their communities' perceived needs to be
met within the scope of realistic economic expectations. For more than one-half of
U.S. hospitals, survival strategy includes investment in multi-institutional arrange-
ments and shared services in order to participate in the benefits of increased scale
and volume. 23
One such form is the HSO-an organization established by two or more
hospitals to provide a variety of administrative or clinical services exclusively
to its nonprofit hospital members.24 The rationale behind HSOs is simple:
they can provide their member hospitals with vital services that each hospital
would otherwise have to provide for itself on a singular, less efficient basis.
HSOs are encouraged because of their potential for containing hospital
CoStS. 26 The benefits derived by nonprofit hospitals from such organizations
can include the avoidance of capital expenditures for the unnecessary dupli-
cation of facilities, equipment, and personnel that results when each hospital
performs the same service singularly; reduced operating costs that result from
the economies of scale produced by their size and operational efficiency; and
higher quality of services. One court has detailed the expected benefits that a
laundry service organization would create:
In 1963, five public or nonprofit, private hospitals located at Indianapolis,
Indiana, and having their own separate laundry facilities, undertook feasibility
studies of a centralized laundry service .... These studies concluded that a cen-
tralized laundry service could save the hospitals $1.1 million in capital con-
struction costs and $159,000 in operational costs per year for a total savings of
about $300,000 per year .... The studies further concluded that each hospital had
to have an active part in managerial control of a centralized laundry facility for
reasons of hospital operation and reduction of CoStS.
27
22. Bromberg lists seven basic forms of cooperation: a § 501(c)(3) organization; a § 501(e) organization; a
nonexempt cooperative under Subchapter T of the Code; ajoint venture or partnership; a for-profit corporation;
a program of a state or local hospital association; and an activity of an individual hospital. I R. BROMBERG, TAX
PLANNING FOR HOSPITALS AND HEALTH-CARE ORGANIZATIONS fl 9.1, at 9-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R.
BROMBERG].
23. Latimer, Systems that secure resources help ensure hospitals' survival, HOSPITALS, Mar. 1, 1977, at
57, 58.
24. Longest, A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Multihospital Arrangement Strategy,
HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV., Winter 1980, at 17, 20. Administrative services are typically described as
the following: purchasing; electronic data processing; laundry and linen; library and information retrieval; bio-
medical or clinical engineering. Clinical services are typically described as the following: blood bank; laboratory;
pathology; radiology; electrocardiogram; physical therapy. For a more comprehensive list, see id. at 21 (table
22, listing 38 services shared by hospitals). See also D. Wegmiller, Shared service programs are on the rise,
HOSPITALS, Apr. I, 1980, at 147; B. Latimer, Systems that secure resources help ensure hospitals' survival,
HOSPITALS, Mar. 1, 1977, at 57, 58-59.
25. The services could be provided in-house or by commercial providers.
26. See generally D. BARRETT, supra note 16, at I; MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS, supra note 16; 1 R.
BROMBERG, supra note 22.
27. United Hospital Servs. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776, 777 (S.D. Ind. 1974). See, e.g., I R.
BROMBERG, supra note 22, r 9. 1, at 9-2; Brown, Sharing: An Overview, in MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS, supra
note 16, at 87, 92-93; Shillings, Cost containment through sharing, HOSPITALS, Jan. 16, 1975, at 48. See also
Tar Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
2765, 2771 (1976) (statement of the American Hospital Ass'n).
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HSOs are also encouraged because the rapid development of medical tech-
nology and the accompanying rise in medical specialization make it difficult
for an individual hospital to obtain or make effective use of newly developed
technologies and services. 28 In view of both the high cost of medical tech-
nology and increasingly limited economic resources, HSOs are widely re-
garded as an attractive optionz9 and a necessary adjunct to the nonprofit
hospital industry's effort to respond to the economic realities of the 1980s.
30
The federal government has long been aware that "the hospital market is
far from the competitive ideal,", 3' and has undertaken to encourage the devel-
opment of cost-efficient methods of operation within the nonprofit hospital
industry. In 1967 Congress declared that "[o]rganizational and administrative
practices in the health service industry must be updated and brought into line
with the most modern practices in other sections of the economy.",32 The
government also recognized that HSOs are one step in that direction. One of
the planning goals set forth in the National Health Planning Act of 1974 was to
encourage "[t]he development of multi-institutional arrangements for the
sharing of support services necessary to all health service institutions. ' 33 The
former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare accordingly declared
its intention "to revise current Medicare regulations to encourage nonprofit
hospitals to pool their resources and to share services, from laundry to billing
services to basic medical programs." 34 And its successor, the Department of
Health and Human Services, has likewise expressed its intention to en-
courage the cooperative sharing of hospital services.35
The foregoing demonstrates that hospital planners and government
representatives recognize the important role HSOs can play in the effort to
contain rising health care costs. HSOs are designed to provide high quality
hospital services at costs lower than they can be provided in-house on an
individual basis. Present experience indicates that they remain popular and
should be encouraged.36
28. S. REP. NO. 724, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076,
2089. See also Latimer, Systems that secure resources help ensure hospitals' survival, HOSPITALS, Mar. 1,
1977, at 57, 58.
29. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
30. See D. Mancino, Avoiding the pitfalls-New revenue sources and tax-exempt status, HOSPITAL
FIN. MANAGEMENT, May 1981, at 46.
31. Sloan & Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Inputs, 23 J. L. & ECON. 81, 81 (1980).
For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the hospital industry's noncompetitive aspect, see id., passim;
Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1419-30 (1980).
32. S. REP. NO. 724, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076,
2087.
33. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-641, § 1502(5), 88 Stat.
2225, 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(5) (1975).
34. DEP'r OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, H.E.W. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1978, at 8 (statement of
former Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr.).
35. Fitschen, Shared Services: Two Viewpoints, in MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 129.
In a recently published interview, Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan noted that "an awful lot can be done to
cut the cost of health care. And I think that's something that we ... have to get control of." Cowan, How
Regan Sees the Budget, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1981, § 3, at4, col. 2. As to how this might be accomplished, he
replied, "By insisting upon efficiency and productivity to equal the amount of price increase." Id.
36. See, e.g., Longest, A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Multihospital Arrangement
Strategy, HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV., Winter 1980, at 17, 20-22.
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2. The Benefits of Tax-Exempt Status
The tax status of an HSO can be critical to its development. Tax-exempt
status under section 501(a) brings the obvious advantage of shielding an or-
ganization from the imposition of federal income tax on its net earnings.37 But
in some ways, the collateral benefits of tax-exempt status are more valuable
to charitable organizations. Tax-exempt status under federal law is often a
prerequisite to corresponding status under state or local laws.38 Because
charitable contributions to organizations exempt under section 501(a) are tax
deductible by corporate and individual donors, 39 -[q]ualification as an organ-
ization within section 501(c)(3) is a prerequisite to successful fund-raising
among individuals and corporations."- 40 In addition, organizations exempt
from taxation under section 501(a) are exempt from federal Social Security
taxes 4' and from federal unemployment taxes. 42 They also have the privilege
of mailing at preferred postal rates and the option of choosing the special
taxation of annuities under section 403(b).43
Without tax-exempt status, HSOs would be disadvantaged in their ability
to raise capital and operating funds, because they would be unable to attract
tax-deductible contributions and foundation grants. These benefits of tax-
exempt status now accrue only to HSOs that perform one or more of the
services enumerated in section 501(e)(1)(A). HSOs that perform any services
not enumerated in section 501(e)(l)(A) are unable to seek funds in this manner
and must pay income tax on their net income.
3. The Statutory Provisions
Section 501(a) confers tax-exempt status on certain organizations de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3). To qualify under section 501(c)(3) an organization
must satisfy three major requirements: it must be both organized and operated
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes and no part of its net earnings
37. I.R.C. § 501(a). The same result can be accomplished by an HSO's distribution or allocation of its net
earnings pursuant to a preexisting obligation to its patron hospitals within the time and in the manner prescribed
for cooperative organizations in I.R.C. §§ 1381-1383, which would leave the organization without taxable income.
See Rev. Rul. 69-633. 1969-2 C.B. 121.
38. See. e.g., Children's Hosp. Medical Cent. v. Board of Assessors, 353 Mass. 35, 227 N.E.2d 908 (1967).
See also R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, '1 9.2[1], at 9-4; Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 213, 220 (1980).
39. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). See generally I R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2[I], at 9-3 to 9-5; P. TREUSCH &
N. SUGARMAN, TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 38-40 (1979); 1 S. WEITHORN, TAX TECH-
NIQUES FOR FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 (1979).
40. Skinrud, Recognition Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Rerenue Code as a Prerequisite to Arts
Grants, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529,546 (1977). See I R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2[l], at 9-4. See also 114
Cong. Rec. 7516 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Carlson).
Both of these benefits would be available to an HSO irrespective of the source of its tax-exempt status, for
the last sentence of § 501(e) states that an organization meeting its requirements shall be treated as both a
hospital and an organization referred to in § 170(b)(l)(A)(iii). The last sentence thus eliminates any problem with
respect to the public charity status of HSOs and permits private foundations to make grants to them. See Tuthill,
Qualifying as a Tax Exempt Cooperative Hospital Service Organization, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 448, 455
(1975).
41. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B).
42. I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8).
43. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 528 (1976).
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can inure to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual. 44 If an organiza-
tion meets these and other requirements of section 501(c)(3) it will be deemed
exempt from federal income taxation.
Section 501(e)45 provides that "cooperative hospital service organiza-
tions" shall be treated as charitable organizations described in section
501(c)(3) so long as four requirements are met. To qualify under section
501(e), an organization must: (1) perform only certain enumerated services that
if performed on its own behalf by an exempt hospital would constitute part of
that hospital's exempt activities;46 (2) be organized and operated to provide
those services solely to two or more nonprofit private or public hospitals;47 (3)
be organized and operated on a cooperative basis and allocate or pay to its
patrons, within 8 months after the close of its taxable year, all its net
earnings on the basis of services performed;48 and (4) if the organization has
capital stock, restrict ownership of that stock to its patrons.49
A comparison of the two subsections reveals that section 501(c)(3) pro-
vides more flexibility than does section 501(e). Exemption under section
501 (c)(3) eliminates the need to comply with the earnings distribution or allo-
cation requirements of section 501(e)(2). This would enable an HSO to retain
its net earnings for such purposes as retiring indebtedness or generating
permanent capital for expansion and acquisition of new equipment.50 Further,
an HSO exempt under section 501(e) is unable to provide services to organiza-
tions other than tax-exempt or public hospitals without endangering its tax-
exempt status.5 By contrast, an HSO exempt under section 501(c)(3) would
arguably be able to provide services to for-profit hospitals if the provision of
such services remained an insubstantial part of its overall activities.5 ' Finally,
an HSO exempt under section 501(e) is limited in the kinds of services it can
provide; if it were exempt under section 50 1(c)(3) it could provide any service,
44. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ !.501(c)(3)-1(a), (b) & (c) (1959). The regulation states in part:
An organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes only if it
engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in
section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)().
45. See note 5 supra.
46. I.R.C. § 501(e)(l)(A). For the list of services, see id. quoted in note 5 supra.
47. I.R.C. § 501(e)(l)(B).
48. I.R.C. § 501(e)(2).
49. I.R.C. § 501(e)(3).
50. 1 R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2(l), at 9-3; D. Mancino, Court Ruling Casts Doubt on Shared
Services' Tax Status, HOSPITAL PROGRESS, Sept. 1981, at 62.
51. See I.R.C. § 501(e)(l)(B)(i)-(iii); Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1979).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) (1959); accord, Chart, Inc. v. United States 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C.
1979), in which plaintiff, an HSO exempt under § 501(e) that provided electronic data processing services to its
tax-exempt member hospitals, sought and was granted tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) charitable organization
in order to enable it to expand its services to include nursing homes.
For a more detailed discussion of the relative disadvantages of § 501(e) status, see generally I R. BROM-
BERG, supra note 22, at ch. 9 (1979); Vracui & Zuckerman, Legal and Financial Constraints on the Develop-
ment and Growth of Multiple Hospital Arrangements, in MULTIHOSPITAL SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 415,
422.
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including laundry, so long as the provision of the service was compatible with
a charitable purpose.
Thus, section 501(e) has been a flawed and "faulty vehicle from the very
start, ' 53 and primary among its flaws has been the exclusion of laundry serv-
ices from the section 501(e)(1)(A) enumeration- As will be developed in
greater detail below,55 the exclusion was not inadvertent. The Conference
Committee report states, "The new subsection does not grant tax-exempt
status if the [HSO] performs any services other than those specified in the
new subsection (for example, laundry services)."' 56 The Court relied on this
legislative history in HCSC-Laundry to support its holding that HSOs are
ineligible for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).
HSOs have sought to be characterized as section 501(c)(3) charitable
organization on the basis of two interrelated theories: the "promotion of
health" theory and the "integral part" theory. 7 The promotion of health is
recognized as a charitable purpose. 8 Therefore, under this theory, HSOs
would be entitled to exemption because they materially further the promotion
of health by peforming services that bear a close connection to the charitable
functions of their hospital members59 and enable those hospitals to further
their charitable purposes.6
Under the "integral part" theory, which is closely related to the "promo-
tion of health" theory and recognized as a method of exemption, 6' exemption
is based on the fact that the services provided by HSOs "are an integral part
of the hospital's activities,, 62 that is, they are "necessary and indispensable
to the operation" of its hospital members.6 3 Under either theory, an HSO
satisfies the requirement that the charitable organization serve a public rather
than a private interest:64 the nonprofit tax-exempt hospitals that are served by
an HSO serve, by definition, a public interest; and the benefits that an HSO
produces ultimately redound to the public in the form of lower costs and
higher quality service. 65 Applying these theories, the District Court in HCSC-
53. 1 R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.3[1], at 9-14.
54. See I.R.C. § 501(e)(1)(A), quoted in note 5 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 90-99 infra.
56. CONF. REP. NO. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2373, 2390 (emphasis supplied); see also S. REP. NO. 94-938 (Part II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3969.
57. 1 R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2[3], at 9-11.
58. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ohio 1978). See also Rev. Rul. 79-17, 1979-1 C.B.
193; Rev. Rul. 75-197, 1975-1 C.B. 156; Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145;
Rev. Rul. 70-590, 1970-2 C.B. 116; Rev. Rut. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 68-1, 1968-1 C.B. 251. See
generally Note, Profitable Business Activities and Charitable Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 270, 272-74 (1976).
59. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-572, 1969-2 C.B. 119 (construction of building to house exempt organizations).
60. See I R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.23, at 9-11 to 9-12.
61. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952), discussed in text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
62. Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1979).
63. Hospital Bur. Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 560, 562 (Ct. CI. 1958).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959).
65. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
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Laundry said: "It is undisputable that a hospital cannot discharge its purposes
without reliable and quality laundry and linen services, which service must
meet standards particular to hospital situations. Therefore, plaintiff undis-
putedly performs an integral and necessary function of charitable organiza-
tions, and we conclude that plaintiff is a charitable organization."
' 66
The nature of an HSO's functions is unquestionably charitable, a conclu-
sion that, even in the face of the IRS contention that HSOs were feeder
organizations, had not been seriously questioned; indeed, the IRS abandoned
its feeder organization argument in its appeal of HCSC-Laundry to the Third
Circuit. 67
It can be said that under section 501(e) EISOs receive the most essential
benefits of tax-exempt status. But this argument overlooks the fact that sec-
tion 501(e), because of its enumeration of services, unduly restricts the kinds
of HSOs that can invoke its provisions. It is bad enough that a service as
valuable to the provision of health care as laundry was intentionally excluded
from section 501(e) by Congress and from section 501(c)(3) by the IRS and the
Court; far worse, in an industry as innovative and fast-changing as the hospi-
tal and health care industry, such a narrow view will have significant and
untoward effects. A recent survey of "shared services" identified some thirty-
eight services that are shared in some manner by hospitals.6S As technologies
and approaches to the provision of health-care services advance and begin to
outstrip the services listed in section 501 (e), the restrictions on the tax-exempt
status of HSOs may well be proved shortsighted.
B. Exempt or Not Exempt?
1. The IRS Position: Section 502 Feeder Organizations
The refusal of the IRS to acknowledge the tax-exempt status of HSOs
under section 501(c)(3) was grounded in its interpretation of section 502,69 the
feeder organization provision. First enacted in 1950,7" section 502, in conjunc-
tion with the unrelated business income provision in sections 511-514, 7' was
66. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 250, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
67. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'd, 450 U.S. 1 1981). See cases
collected in note 13 supra.
68. Longest, A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Multihospital Arrangement Strategy,
HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT REV., Winter 1980, at 17, 21. See Bromberg, The Effect of Tar Policy on the
Delivery and Cost of Health Care, 53 TAXES 452, 460 (1975).
69. See note 9 supra.
70. The feeder organization provision was added to the tax statute as an amendment to § 101 of the 1939
Code. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 814, § 301(b), 64 Stat. 906, 953 (1950). The provision was carried over
materially unchanged into the 1954 Code. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 166,26 U.S.C. §
502 (1954).
71. I.R.C. § 511 imposes a tax on the "unrelated business taxable income" ofcertain tax-exempt organiza-
tions. I.R.C. § 512 defines "unrelated business taxable income" as "the gross income derived by any organiza-
tion from any unrelated trade or business," as further defined by I.R.C. § 513(a): "any trade or business the
conduct of which is not substantially related ... to exercise or performance by such organization of its
charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section
501 ... "
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intended to eliminate an unfair competitive advantage that certain corpora-
tions, operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for
profit, were perceived to enjoy by virtue of tax-exempt status acquired under
the so-called "destination of income" test.72 Under this test, a corporation
could obtain tax-exempt status regardless of the nature of its activity so long
as its income was transferred to one or more exempt organizations. 73
In 1952 the IRS issued a controversial regulation that, in the words of one
commentator, "clearly extended the application of Section 502 to situations
never contemplated by Congress." 74 The regulation75 begins by stating that a
subsidiary organization of a tax-exempt organization that would be exempt on
the ground that "its activities are an integral part of the exempt activities of
the parent organization" will not lose its exemption because, as a matter of
accounting between it and the parent organization, it "derives a profit from its
dealings with its parent organization .... .. The regulation then provides
that a subsidiary organization will not be deemed exempt if it engages in
activities that would be unrelated to its parent organization's exempt activi-
ties if performed by the parent. The regulation gives this example: "[I]f a
subsidiary organization is operated primarily for the purpose of furnishing
electric power to consumers other than its parent organization (and the
parent's tax-exempt subsidiary organizations), it is not exempt since such
72. See H. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 408-09, 412, 469; S. REP.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 504-05, 509, 565-66.
The "destination of income" test was first enunciated in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores De La
Provincia Del Santismo Rosario De Filipinas, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). Plaintiff, an incorporated religious order,
earned income from properties consisting of real estate and securities holdings and from occasional sales of wine
and chocolate. All the income was used to fund its religious and charitable activities. The IRS, though admitting
that plaintiff was organized and operated for religious, charitable, and educational purposes, nonetheless argued
that the organization was not exempt because it received income from business sources and was not, therefore,
operated exclusively for those purposes. In response the Supreme Court said:
Whether the contention is well taken turns primarily on the meaning of the excepting clause, before
quoted from the taxing act. Two matters apparent on the face of the clause go far towards settling its
meaning. First, it recognizes that a corporation may be organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and yet have a net income. Next, it says nothing
about the source of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate test of exemption.
Id. at 581. The Court concluded that holding the properties for income and the incidental transaction in wine and
chocolate did not constitute engaging in a trade or business. Id. at 582.
The "destination of income" test was later applied to hold exempt an organization that was organized and
operated for the purpose of conducting a business for profit but which "fed" all its income to an exempt
charitable foundation, on the ground that the destination, not the source, of the income was dispositive. Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); accord, Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1957); Boman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957); C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,
190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951); Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950).
A number of courts, however, rejected the "destination of income" test as applied to organizations not
directly engaged in exempt activities, and instead focused on the nature of the organization's activities and the
source of the income. University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971); Riker v.
Commissioner, 244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1957); Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957); Ralph
H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Community Servs.,
Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181
F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950).
73. See, e.g., C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951).
74. Bromberg, The Effect of Tax Policy on the Delivery and Cost of Health Care, 53 TAXES 452,456 (1975).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952).
76. Id.
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business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by the
parent organization.- 77 If a subsidiary organization furnishes electric power
to related tax-exempt organizations, its tax-exempt status is not endangered.
However, the statement in the regulation that "[a]n exempt organization is
not related to another exempt organization merely because they both engage
in the same type of exempt activities, ' 78 makes it abundantly clear that if the
subsidiary79 engages in activities for the benefit of "several unrelated exempt
organizations, -80 it is not exempt-even though the so-called unrelated ex-
empt organizations created, own, and control the subsidiary and engage in the
same type of exempt activities, and even though the subsidiary's activities are
integrally related to their exempt activities.
On the authority of this interpretation of section 502, the IRS in 1954
ruled that the corporation organized and operated for the primary purpose of
operating a purchasing agency for a number of tax-exempt hospitals was not
itself exempt on the ground that it was engaged in business activities that
would be unrelated activities if carried on by any one of the organizations
served. 8' Thus, in baffling fashion, was born the IRS antipathy toward HSOs.
2. The Hospital Bureau Decision: Exempt as Charitable Organizations
The IRS interpretation was rejected by the Court of Claims in a decision
that continues to be the starting point of any analysis of the issue, Hospital
Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States.82 The case involved a
corporation that was organized to purchase hospital supplies for its tax-
exempt member hospitals and to maintain a research department to establish
uniform standards of quality and price for the supplies. The plaintiff sought
exemption under the predecessor of section 501 (c)(3) 83 as a charitable organi-
zation. The IRS argued that since it performed no hospital services as such,
the corporation was organized for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade
or business for profit and was therefore a feeder organization under the
predecessor to section 502. On the basis of Squire v. Students Book Corp.,84 a
1951 Ninth Circuit decision which had held that a bookstore owned by a
tax-exempt university was exempt from taxation because its activity bore an
intimate relationship to the functioning of the university, the Court of Claims
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Note that the regulation does not say "subsidiary organization." The word "'subsidiary" was dropped
from Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.101-2(b) (1950), in response to Hospital Bur. Standards & Supply, Inc. v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958). "Apparently the Commissioner realized that the inaccurate use of the word
subsidiary in this sentence drew too much attention to the close relationship between the controlled corporation
and its tax-exempt owners." Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213,219 (1980). See T.D.
6662, 1963-2 C.B. 214, 216.
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952).
81. Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 C.B. 127. The IRS's interpretation is analyzed below. See text accompanying
notes 100-27 infra.
82. 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 101(6), 53 Stat. I (now I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
84. 191 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1951).
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found in Hospital Bureau that the plaintiff was an integral part of the opera-
tion of its hospital members because the services it performed were "neces-
sary and indispensable to the operation of... member hospitals." 8' s Of no
consequence was the fact that in this case the HSO performed its services for
more than one tax-exempt hospital. Without detailed analysis, the court ques-
tioned the applicability of the feeder organization regulation to member hospi-
tals that were engaged in related charitable activities,86 and then concluded
that plaintiff was not a feeder organization: the nature of its activities and its
corporate and financial structure were not the "indicia of an organization
operating for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for
profit." 8 7 "At most," the court continued, presaging the argument that would
be made twenty years later, "the plaintiff was performing a function which
each of its member hospitals would have to assume were it not for plaintiff's
existence." 8
The IRS refused to follow the holding of Hospital Bureau and instead
amended the regulation under section 502 to make clear what the regulation
meant by "related." 89 Despite their success in court, the proponents of HSOs
were thus faced with the alternatives of continuing the expensive and time-
consuming litigation to compel the IRS to alter its position or of seeking
legislative relief to reach the same result.
3. The Enactment of Section 501(e)
In the face of the IRS's intransigency, the nonprofit hospital industry
sought redress by means of a legislative solution to the problem of the tax-
exempt status of HSOs. Resort to the legislative process was deemed prefer-
able to uncertain, costly, and prolonged litigation, notwithstanding the cer-
85. 158 F. Supp. 560, 562 (Ct. Cf. 1958).
86. Id. at 563. The court stated:
We question the applicability of [the] Treasury... Regulations to a membership corporation
where the members are engaged in related charitable activities. Here the plaintiff is composed entirely
of member hospitals. Its services are available only to the member institutions. To construe the
Regulations as denying exemption in this particular case could require distortion of the language
employed.
Id. (footnote omitted). The language to which the court referred was that part of the regulation which read:
"'Similarly, if the subsidiary is owned by several unrelated exempt organizations, and is operated for the
purpose of furnishing electric power to each of them, it is not exempt since such business would be an unrelated
trade or business if regularly carried on by any one ofthe tax-exempt organizations." Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.101-2(b)
(1950). The court evidently read "'unrelated" limitedly-not, as the IRS did, in its technical corporate-
structure sense. Hence, for the court, the hospitals at issue were "related" in that they all performed hospital
services on a nonprofit basis; they were, therefore, "'engaged in related charitable activities." The IRS reaction
to the Hospital Bureau decision confirms this view. See note 89 infra. The IRS was, then, hoisted by its own
petard.
87. 158 F. Supp. 560, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
88. Id.
89. The IRS amended Treas. Reg. § 1.502-I(b) in 1963, adding the provisions explaining that organizations
are to be considered related only if they are a parent and one or more of its subsidiaries, or subsidiaries having a
common parent. Engaging in the same kind of exempt activities would not constitute relatedness. Treas. Reg. §
1.502-1(b), T.D. 6662, 1963-2 C.B. 214; see note 86 supra.
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tainty of spirited resistance from the vocal commercial laundry and linen
industry lobby. 9°
The first effort, in 1967, ended in failure. Under a proposed amendment
to the Social Security Amendments of 1967, 9' organizations created by tax-
exempt hospitals to supply them with certain services would have been
treated as charitable organizations, provided the service performed was of a
type that, if performed by the hospitals on their own behalf, would constitute
an integral part of their exempt activities.92 This amendment was rejected in
conference. 93
In 1968 Congress succeeded in amending section 501 by adding the new
subsection (e). 94 Unlike the 1967 version, the 1968 version contained the
enumeration of services, which of course had the effect of limiting the utility
of section 501 (e) by excluding laundry services and of prolonging the dispute
between the nonprofit hospital industry and the IRS. Had laundry services
been included in section 50 l(e)(1)(A)-or better, not excluded, by eliminating
the enumeration altogether-it is unlikely the present controversy would have
arisen. But since laundry services are an extremely valuable-indeed, indis-
pensable95-aspect of a hospital's health care task, proponents of HSOs con-
tinued to press for exemption under section 501(c)(3). It takes little familiarity
with the costs and inconveniences of litigation to appreciate that hospital
laundry service organizations would have forgone section 50 1(c)(3) status had
section 501(e) status been available to them, notwithstanding the advantages
of status under the former section. 96
The IRS understandably viewed the enactment of section 50 1(e) as vindi-
cation of its position that HSOs do not qualify for exemption under section
501(c)(3). In Revenue Ruling 69-160'7 the IRS ruled that an HSO providing
laundry services for its member hospitals in addition to services specified in
section 501(e)(l)(A) did not meet the requirements of section 501(e). In Reve-
nue Ruling 69-63393 it ruled that an HSO organized and operated on a coopera-
tive basis to provide laundry services to its member hospitals was not exempt
90. It is generally accepted that the ultimate form of§ 501(e) and the exclusion of laundry services from the
enumerated list were the result of lobbying by the commercial laundry and linen supply industries. See HCSC-
Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428, 435 (3rd Cir. 1980), af d, 450 U.S. 1 (1981); Bromberg, TheEffect ofTax
Policy on the Delivery and Cost of Health Care, 53 TAXES 452, 459 (1975). The commercial laundry and linen
industry lobby urged the Senate Finance Committee not to give special tax treatment to laundry service
organizations. See Certain Committee Amendments to H.R. 10612: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1976) (statement of John J. Contney, Executive Director, Linen Supply
Association of America).
91. Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1967).
92. See S. REP. No. 774, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01, 318-19, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS. 2834, 3158.
93. See CONF. REP. NO. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3179, 3220.
94. See note 9 supra.
95. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 45-68 supra.
97. 1969-1 C.B. 147.
98. 1969-2 C.B. 121.
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under section 501(c)(3). 99 The unarticulated premise of the latter ruling was
that HSOs do not qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(3) because they
are feeder organizations, the same contention rejected in Hospital Bureau.
4. The Feeder Organization Contention
In light of the Court's disposition of the HCSC-Laundry case, it is per-
haps academic to analyze in depth the IRS feeder organization objection to
the tax-exempt status of HSOs.'0° But to view in the proper light the effort by
the proponents of HSOs to seek amendment of section 501 after the IRS
refusal to follow the Hospital Bureau decision and the effect of that amend-
ment, the merits of that position should be explored.
Section 501(a) provides that an organization described in subsection
(c)(3) is exempt from taxation unless the exemption is denied under section
502. "" The IRS concluded that HSOs came within section 502 and therefore
denied them exemption. The Hospital Bureau court apparently deemed the
IRS interpretation incongruous with the language and reason of section 502.'0"
If the feeder organization contention lacks persuasive force, then added sup-
port would be given to the view that Congress intended section 50 1(e) to be a
safe harbor of exemption for certain HSOs.'°3
The IRS contention is challenged on the ground that neither the regula-
tion"'° nor Revenue Ruling 54-305'05 bears a logically consistent relationship
to the language or reason of section 502. '06 The gravamen of the criticism,
succinctly put, is that " It]here is simply no justification for taxing a collective
effort that, if individually performed, would not be subject to taxation." 107 An
analysis of Treasury Regulations section 1.502-1(b) supports this view.
For purposes of analysis, reference will be made to the following three
examples representing the IRS interpretation of section 502:108
(1) A subsidiary organization is exempt if it is operated for the sole
99. Id. The ruling's reasoning went as follows:
In order to qualify as a cooperative hospital service organization under the provisions of section
501(e) of the Code, an organization must be organized and operated solely to perform one or more of
the services specified in section 501(e)(l)(A) .... Since laundry services are not one of the services
specified in that section, the organization does not meet the requirements of section 501(e).... and
thus is not exempt from Federal income taxation under section 501(c)(3).
Id.
100. See note 9 supra.
101. See note 2 supra.
102. See note 86 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 129-39 infra.
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952). See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
105. 1954-2 C.B. 127. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
106. See I R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.213], at 9-8 to 9-10; Bromberg, The Effect of Tax Policy on the
Delivery and Cost of Health Care, 53 TAXES 452, 456-57 (1975).
107. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Hospital Association in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 3,
HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. I (1981). See text accompanying note 88 supra.
108. The examples are a distillation of those given in Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952). See Associated Hosp.
Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 224 (1980). See also text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
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purpose of providing a service for the benefit of its parent organization,
so long as that service is an integral part of the latter's exempt activities;
(2) A subsidiary organization is not exempt if it is operated pri-
marily for the purpose of providing a service (e.g., electric power) to
consumers other than its parent organization, since such business would
be an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by the parent
organization; and
(3) An organization owned by several unrelated exempt organiza-
tions and operated for the purpose of providing a service to each of them
is not exempt, because that business would be an unrelated trade or
business if regularly carried on by any one of the tax-exempt organiza-
tions.
The first example describes the situation in which one organization pro-
vides a service that is an integral part of the functions of a tax-exempt organi-
zation and thereby assumes the tax-exempt status of its parent organiza-
tion. 09 The "integral part" theory has been applied elsewhere by the IRS"0
and by the courts-most notably in Squire v. Students Book Corp.,"' relied
upon by the court in Hospital Bureau. The second example clearly fits the
feeder organization mold: the subsidiary organization is operated primarily
for commercial, not charitable, purposes. If it then "feeds" the resulting
profits to its tax-exempt parent organization, it becomes identical with the
very examples of the application of the discredited destination of income test
of exemption that section 502 was designed to eliminate.1
2
The logic and familiarity of the regulation disappears, however, upon
consideration of the third example. There is no obvious connection between it
and the language of section 502, nor between it and the second example, to
which the analogy of nonexemption is drawn. The Tax Court, although af-
firming the validity of the regulation, 3 expressed doubt about whether the
third example reflected the import of section 502, and noted, "What the
regulation should tell us is why the analogy should b9 made to the second
109. See text accompanying notes 61-66 supra.
110. See Rev. Rul. 7841, 1978-1 C.B. 148, which held that a trust created by a hospital to serve as
repository of funds to satisfy malpractice claims against the hospital was exempt. The ruling states:
By serving as a repository for funds paid in by the hospital, and by making payments at the direction of
the hospital to persons with malpractice claims against the hospital, the trust is operating as an integral
part of the hospital. Of equal importance is the fact that the trust is performing a function that the
hospital could do directly.
Id. at 149 (emphasis supplied). See also Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184; Rev. Rul. 67-217, 1967-2 C.B. 181;
Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240.
I11. 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
112. See, e.g., C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951); Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). For a discussion of the destination of income test, see note 72 supra.
It is clear from the legislative history of the predecessor to § 502 that the section was intended to change the
result of the cases applying the destination of income test. See S. REP. NO. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3053, 3088. The technical discussion of the section gives the following
example of the section's intended effect: "The paragraph applies to organizations operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit, as for example, a feeder corporation whose business is the
manufacture of automobiles for the ultimate profit of an educational institution." Id. at 3176.
113. Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213 (1980).
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example rather than the first example, where the opposite result obtains." ,"4
Indeed it should. This part of the regulation ignores the fact that an HSO
performs services that are an integral part of the exempt functions of each
member hospital. It is, in that respect, no different from a subsidiary organiza-
tion of one hospital or the respective subsidiary organizations of a number of
hospitals, all of which come within the exemption ambit of the first example.
To say, as does the regulation, that an HSO that performs services for two or
more hospitals is nonexempt because the hospitals are unrelated to one
another' '5-that is, do not enjoy a parent-subsidiary relationship-does not
address the issue." 6 The only distinction between the situation in which an
HSO performs services for a number of hospitals and the one in which the
same services are provided to a number of hospitals individually by their
respective subsidiary organizations is that in the former the subsidiary organi-
zations have been consolidated into one organization for purposes consistent
with the federal government's effort to encourage cost containment measures.
Section 502 addresses itself to an organization operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit. " 7 The primary purpose
of an HSO, notwithstanding that it performs commercial services, is charita-
ble when determined on the basis of all the circumstances. "8 Its purpose is to
facilitate the accomplishment of its member hospitals' exempt functions-the
provision of health care-by providing them with cost-effective and high
quality services. The benefits of their activities redound to the public in the
form of lower hospital costs and better care." 9 Rather than bringing to mind
section 502, this suggests the "promotion of health" theory of exemption
under section 501(c)(3).' 20 As far as profit-making potential is concerned, an
HSO does not derive profit by selling its services to outside consumers-the
second example-and then "feed" the ensuing profit to its tax-exempt hos-
pital members. Rather, as the Tax Court noted, any profit results from trans-
actions taking place within "a closed circle,"'12' not within a commercial
market. Profit in this context typically results from an HSO setting user fees
114. Id. at 228.
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952). See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
116. Judge Nims in Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 219 (1980), though
finding in favor of the IRS on the ground that Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) had been congressionally approved by
means of the reenactment doctrine, said: -It might be observed in this connection that the question of whether
the common owners of the scrutinized corporation are or are not related to each other is totally beside the
point-a more relevant inquiry... would appear to be whether the service organization is integrally related to
the common owners." Id. at 219.
117. See note 9 supra. See also Veterans Foundation v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Utah
1959), affd, 281 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421,426 (4th Cir.
1951). Judge Nims observed: "'The critical inquiry is whether petitioner's primary purpose for engaging in its
sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a
commercial business producing profits for [itself] .... Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 213, 228-29 (1980) (quoting B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978)).
118. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(e) (1959). See also HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 15
n.13 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
121. Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 229 (1980).
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slightly above operational cost to enable it to service its debt and invest in
capital equipment. 22 Thus, any profit is derived from the hospital members
and, implicit in the arrangement, ultimately accrues to each of them in the
form of patronage refunds or the HSO's own heightened capacity to perform
services. Accordingly, "[w]e would therefore question whether the profit, if
any, derived by [an HSO] was any different from the profit between an ex-
empt parent and its wholly owned subsidiary exempted by the [IRS] in regu-
lation sec. 1.502-1(b)."' 23 Both would merely reflect bookkeeping arrange-
ments between the parent and subsidiary organizations.'24
The third example suggests that an HSO would not be exempt because
the service it provides would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly
carried on by any one of the parent organizations. This presumes that through
the subsidiary, each of the parent organizations is providing services to and
deriving income from the others. '25 Conceptual difficulties aside, this conten-
tion is likewise not supported by the evidence. Each hospital is in effect doing
business only with itself and in the same manner as if each had established a
subsidiary to perform a service for itself alone-the first example. The rela-
tion between each hospital and the HSO depends upon and is directly propor-
tional to the demand for services. Any profit realized by the HSO is derived
from and in turn benefits directly or indirectly each hospital in direct propor-
tion to the volume of business done with each.' 26 In this sense, the HSO is
nothing more than a more efficient analogue of each hospital's previous ser-
vice provider. It cannot be said that each hospital is vicariously engaged in an
unrelated trade or business through the instrumentality of the HSO.
The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that HSOs do not fall
within the language or reason of section 502. On the other hand, the argument
for the tax-exempt status of HSOs as charitable organizations fares consider-
ably better. As noted, 2 7 under either the "promotion of health" or "integral
part" theory it can be demonstrated that an HSO serves a public rather than a
private interest by providing its hospital members with essential services
efficiently and at low cost.
The dubious validity of the IRS feeder organization contention thus lends
an ironic counterpoint to the dispute over the tax-exempt status of HSOs. The
IRS position that HSOs were feeder organizations compelled the legislative
effort to amend section 501. Had the IRS not persisted in its wrong-headed
122. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428,430 (3rd Cir. 1980), affd, 450 U.S. 1 (1981):
The corporation has no capital stock. Each participating hospital is a dues-paying
member.... HCSC-Laundry's only income in addition to the dues is a laundry charge of I1V2 per
pound of laundry serviced which is charged to each customer over the actual cost. "'Cost" for this
purpose includes operating expenses, debt retirement, and linen replacement. This charge in excess of
cost is placed in a fund for equipment replacement and acquisition.
123. Associated Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 213, 229 (1980).
124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952) (first sentence).
125. See I R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2[3], at 9-8 to 9-9, for an excellent discussion of the issue.
126. Id.
127. See text accompanying notes 57-66 supra.
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interpretation of section 502, Congress would not have undertaken its ill-fated
attempt to clarify the law, and HSOs, including laundry service organizations,
would be exempt today as charitable organizations under section 501(c)(3). In
this case, an unnecessary problem led to a regrettable solution.
C. The Return to the Courts
It was clear soon after its enactment that section 50 1(e) was inadequate as
a vehicle of exemption for HSOs. Consequently, HSOs-almost exclusively
those performing laundry services'28-retumed to the courts armed with
Hospital Bureau to seek exemption under section 501(c)(3). They were met
not only by the feeder organization argument, wounded by Hospital Bureau,
but also by an argument made possible by the enactment of section 501(e),
one that in HCSC-Laundry would prove decisive. The IRS contended that
since laundry services were not specified in section 501(e)(1)(A), laundry
service organizations could not qualify for exemption under section 50 1(e)-a
position consistent with the earlier IRS rulings. Even more important, the
argument continued, the deliberate exclusion of laundry services from section
50 1(e) is conclusive evidence that Congress intended not to favor such organi-
zations with tax-exempt status. It followed, therefore, that Congress intended
section 501(e) to be the exclusive method of exemption for HSOs as a class,
for to hold otherwise would permit them to obtain the same tax-exempt
status, as well as additional benefits under section 50 1(c)(3). According to the
IRS, such a result would render section 501(e) a nullity and frustrate congres-
sional purpose.
The first case to consider this argument was United Hospital Services,
Inc. v. United States, 29 which involved the claim of a laundry service organi-
zation that it qualified for exemption as a section 501(c)(3) charitable or-
ganization. 3 The IRS countered with the argument that section 501(e) pre-
cluded plaintiff from seeking exemption under section 501 (c)(3). The IRS also
continued, however, to press its original point, arguing that in any event
plaintiff was a feeder organization. 13' The court rejected both contentions. As
for the first, the court ambiguously 32 reasoned that though Congress had
excluded laundry services from section 501(e)(1)(A), it did not follow that the
addition of section 501 (e) precluded plaintiff from consideration under section
501(c)(3) "on its own merits."1 33 The court concluded that
[t]he clearly expressed Congressional purpose behind the enactment of Section
128. By the time the Supreme Court decided HCSC-Laundry, in only one case, Chart, Inc. v. United
States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1979), had an HSO that performed services other than laundry sought exemp-
tion directly under § 501(c)(3).
129. 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
130. Id. at 777.
131. Id. at 781. The IRS had argued that the addition of section 501(e) in 1968 clearly showed the intent of
Congress to exclude hospital laundry service organizations from being treated as charitable organizations under
section 501(c)(3). Id. at 780.
132. See note 134 infra.
133. 384 F. Supp. 776, 780 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
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501(e) was to enlarge the category of charitable organizations under Section
501(c)(3) to include certain cooperative hospital service organizations, and not to
narrow or restrict the reach of Section 501(c)(3). The latter section was not modi-
fied by the legislation in any way, and the legislation does not purport to take away
charitable status from a corporation which had already acquired it. Insofar as this
case is concerned, therefore, Section 501(e) is irrelevant. 34
This passage was subsequently interpreted to imply that section 501(e) had
been intended to be a "safe harbor" of exemption.135
The court in United Hospital Services analyzed the feeder organization
contention within the framework of the unfair competition focus of section
502 and found that the plaintiff did not compete unfairly with commercial
laundries, since none was able or willing to provide the specialized laundry
service needed by the hospitals. 136 Finding the case completely analogous to
Hospital Bureau, 137 the court held the plaintiff to be a charitable organization:
the plaintiff promoted the public health by lessening general hospital ex-
penses, freeing up money for further services, and making available space
normally allocated to laundries. 38 Finally, the court curtly dismissed the
applicability of Treasury Regulations section 1.502-1(b): "Charitably
put .... the court has difficulty in finding any basis in [section 502] for the
underlined portion of the regulation." 139
Despite the court's restrained analysis, United Hospital Services was a
significant decision. It provided part of the footing upon which five district
courts 4' and the Court of Claims 14 subsequently held HSOs exempt under
section 501(c)(3). It also further eroded whatever logical and interpretative
integrity the IRS's feeder organization argument may have had, perforce sub-
stantiating the view that HSOs, whether by virtue of the "promotion of
health" or the "integral part" theory, are intrinsically charitable in nature. 42
In the interim between United Hospital Services and the decisions that
followed, the American Hospital Association' 43 proposed an amendment that
134. Id. at 781. The penultimate sentence of the quoted passage raised the question whether the United
Hospital Services decision was somehow dependent upon the fact that the plaintiff was doing business before §
501(e) was adopted. In subsequent cases relying on the decision, the holding was not so narrowed. See
Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857, 860-61 (E.D. Mich. 1978),
rev'd, 634 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1980). That the IRS even put forth the argument, however, attests to its suspicion
that the feeder organization argument was logically and practically bankrupt.
135. See, e.g., Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857, 860 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), rev'd, 634 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1980); Northern Cal. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620,
624 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
136. 384 F. Supp. 776, 777, 780 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
137. Id. at 781.
138. Id. at 780-81.
139. Id. at 782. The portion of the disputed regulation to which the court referred reads: "'Similarly, if the
organization is owned by several unrelated exempt organizations, and is operated for the purpose of furnishing
electric power to each of them, it is not exempt since such business would be an unrelated trade or business if
regularly carried on by any one of the tax-exempt organizations .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1952).
140. See cases collected in note 13 supra.
141. Northern Cal. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
142. 384 F. Supp. 760, 779-81 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
143. In its statement submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance, the American Hospital Association
gave the following justification for an amendment:
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would have added laundry and clinical services to the enumerated list of
section 501 (e)(1)(A)' 44 and thereby ended the necessity of further litigation to
establish the exempt status of HSOs. The word "laundry," however, was
stricken from the amendment on the floor of the Senate. 45 The 1976 legisla-
tive effort strengthened the contention that Congress did not intend to favor
laundry service organizations with tax-exempt status. The question whether
section 50 1(e) was intended to be a "safe harbor" or the exclusive method of
exemption assumed central importance, drawing attention away from critical
examination of the moribund feeder organization argument.'46
As noted, United Hospital Services preceded and laid the groundwork
for a series of lower federal court decisions granting HSOs tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3). All but one147 involved a laundry service organiza-
tion. Although all the courts rejected both IRS arguments, it must be noted
that not all did so without reservation. The court in Chart, Inc. v. United
States, holding that an HSO that provided electronic data processing could
obtain tax-exempt status under section 50 1(c)(3) even though it already quali-
fied for exemption under section 501(e), stated:
The Court shall follow the unanimous conclusion of the courts that have faced the
issue-cooperative service organizations which cannot qualify under section
501(e) may still qualify under section 501(c)(3). Accepting that conclusion, the
Court is faced with a dilemma. If the Court holds that organizations which qualify
under section 501(e) may not qualify under section 501(c)(3), such organizations
We are confident that excluding laundry services from section 501(e) and the liability for state and
local taxes that may accompany this exclusion have slowed the growth of cooperative laundries to
serve hospitals. Amending the law to include laundry services, would, in our view, be in the public
interest by accelerating the formation of cooperative laundries to serve hospitals and helping them to
deliver better health services more economically.
Recommendation: That Section 501(e) of the Internal Revenue Code be amended to include
"laundry services" among the activities cooperative hospital service organizations may perform for
their members.
Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2765, 2771 (1976)
(Statement of the American Hospital Ass'n).
144. See S. REP. No. 94-938 (part II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, reprinted in [ 19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4030, 4100.
145. 122 CONG. REC. 25915 (1976). Sen. Ford proposed the amendment to the bill that deleted the word
"laundry" and gave as his reasons therefor the following:
Mr. President, my amendment simply deletes the word "'laundry" from the list of exempted
services that may be performed by hospital cooperatives. The amendment proposed by the [Senate
Finance] Committee has an objective, the control of the spiraling hospital costs.
I share that concern and commend the members for their effort. I believe that the inclusion of
laundry services may have the opposite effect. With the high construction costs, co-op laundries may
have a beneficial value over their life cycle. But, initially the cost of providing service may be higher
than could be purchased from commercial business.
We must find a solution to rising costs, but the effectiveness of intrusion into the private sector is
questionable. We should undertake the expansion in those areas in which services cannot be obtained
at comparable costs from the private sector. However, we should assure that real savings will result.
We surely should not approve an action that might increase hospital costs, even next year. Thus, I
feel that the investments required by the cooperatives and those that have been incurred by private
business, dictate that this service be deleted.
Id. The Senator's rationale, which exhibits a myopic predilection for short-term results, was endorsed by Sen.
Curtis, and the amendment was immediately approved by voice vote. Id.
146. See text accompanying notes 100-27 supra.
147. Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1979).
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can easily avoid the section 501(e) restrictions by altering their form and qualifying
under section 501(c)(3) .... Such a result borders on the absurd. On the other
hand, permitting organizations which qualify under section 501(e) to qualify under
section 50 l(c)(3) would render section 501(e) essentially meaningless. However, in
view of the unanimity of the laundry cases, the Court is constrained to hold that
the latter alternative is the more acceptable option available to the Court. It would
be absurd to permit only those organizations which fail to qualify under section
501(e) the advantages of section 501(c)(3).148
Then, expressing a sentiment that would be echoed by the appellate courts
and the Supreme Court, the court concluded that "this area is ripe for re-
examination by the Congress." 149 As will be developed below,' 50 the Chart
court's perceived dilemma was the result of Congress' ambiguous and per-
haps ambivalent treatment of the HSO question. It will be argued that the
result reached by the Chart court, though unsatisfactory in some respects to
that court, is by far preferable to the opposite resolution reached by the
Supreme Court.
III. HCSC-LAuNDR Y v. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts and Decisions Below
HCSC-Laundry was organized in 1967 to provide laundry and linen ser-
vices to fifteen nonprofit hospitals and an ambulance service, all exempt from
taxation under section 501(c)(3). Before construction began, a local planning
council had concluded that quality laundry and linen services could be pro-
vided more economically to the member hospitals if performed co-
operatively.51 Upon rejection of its application for exemption by the IRS,
HCSC-Laundry filed suit in Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania seeking a refund of the federal income taxes it had paid. 15
2
In the District Court the IRS argued that HCSC-Laundry was not entitled
to an exemption, both because it was a feeder organization under section 502
and because the denial of an express exemption in section 501(e) for laundry
service organizations precluded plaintiff from consideration under section
50 1(c)(3)-in short, the IRS argued that section 501(e) was the only means by
which HSOs could obtain exemption. The District Court ruled against the IRS
as to both contentions. 15' The basis for its finding that HCSC-Laundry quali-
148. Id. at 14.
149. Id. Accord, HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428,435 (3rd Cir. 1980) ("The result reflects the
political process in operation. Requests for relief or for change must be directed to Congress."), affd, 450 U.S.
1, 8 (1981) ("The Congress easily can change the statute whenever it is so inclined."); Metropolitan Detroit Area
Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 63.4 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Congress might well wish to reconsider
this decision.").
150. See text accompanying notes 165-85 infra.
151. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 250, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
152. HCSC-Laundry sought refund of $10,395 in income taxes paid on taxable income of $123,521. Id.
153. "We find that plaintiff is not barred from exemption because its activities were not expressly ex-
empted from taxation under § 501(e), that plaintiff is an exempt organization under § 501(c)(3), and that the
provisions of § 502(a) do not apply to plaintiff." Id. at 255.
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fled for exemption under section 501(c)(3) was that the services the laundry
performed for its member hospitals were integral and necessary to the func-
tion of those charitable organizations. 5 4 As to the question that would ulti-
mately reach the Supreme Court, the court found that the "purpose of
§ 501 (e) was to enlarge the category of charitable organizations exempt under
§ 501(c)(3), not to modify or narrow § 501(c)(3)." 55 And as for the exclusion
of laundry services from section 501(e), the court observed that "Congress
was merely declining to become embroiled in a very sensitive issue."
56
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, found itself con-
strained to hold in favor of the IRS, counting as persuasive the legislative
history of section 50 1(e). The court began its analysis with the premise that
laundry services were intentionally excluded from section 501(e) and con-
cluded that section 501(e) is the exclusive method by which HSOs can gain
tax-exempt status since "a review of the legislative history supports
the ... Service's position that the statute reflects an explicit manifestation of
legislative judgment and purpose not to afford cooperative hospital laundries
tax-exempt status." 57 To reach this broadly styled conclusion, the court was
compelled to invoke a rule of statutory construction that in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent, "a specific statute controls over a general one.'" 18
Noting that the Court of Claims had in Northern California Central Serv-
ices, Inc. v. United States159 reached an opposite conclusion on the basis of
Hospital Bureau, the court said:
As noted in our prior discussion we believe the legislative history to show a
contrary legislative intent than that found by the Court of Claims. We believe that
it demonstrates that Congress recognized that hospital service organizations were
not heretofore encompassed within section 501(c), or that their inclu-
sion ... was questionable. In order to clarify its position, Congress enacted sec-
tion 501(e) to specify that certain types of hospital service organizations shall be
considered as charitable organizations. If they had already been within section
501(c), the enactment of section 501(e) would have been a totally superfluous
undertaking by Congress, an anomalous result which we cannot attribute io it.160
The court did not consider the feeder organization contention, deciding the
154. Id. at 254.
155. Id. at 253. The court's conclusion that 501(e) "enlarged" the category of charitable organizations
described in § 501(c)(3) suggests that prior to § 501(e), HSOs were not charitable organizations described in
§ 501(c)(3). It is submitted that this is not what the court meant-indeed, it would vitiate the court's argument
and conclusion that the exclusion of laundry services from § 501(e) does not preclude laundry service organiza-
tions from obtaining exempt status under § 501(c)(3). In light of the court's conclusion, it is evident that the court
viewed § 501(e) as a "safe harbor" of exemption for the organizations described therein.
156. Id. at 254.
157. 624 F.2d 428, 434 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'd, 450 U.S. 1 (1981).
158. Id. at 432-33.
159. 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
160. 624 F.2d 428,435-36 (3rd Cir. 1980). The same conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 330 (1980). That court
held that in order for an HSO to be exempt under § 501 it must be among the cooperatives listed in § 501(e). Id. at
334. The court based its conclusion on the legislative history of § 501(e), the principle of statutory construction
that a specific provision controls a general provision, and its desire not "to attribute to Congress the passing of a
superfluous statute." Id.
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case on the basis of section 501(e) alone because the IRS had not appealed
from the lower court's holding on that point.
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Court's analysis is brief and indeed does little more than restate the
Third Circuit's opinion. Starting from the introductory premise that every
element of gross income is subject to tax unless there is a statute or rule of law
exempting it, the Court went on to note that sections 501(a) and (c)(3) provide
such an exemption and that section 501(e) is part of section 501. The Court
next observed that section 501 (e) is expressly concerned with the tax status of
HSOs but that it omits laundry services from its enumerated list of services.
Thus, the Court concluded, the "issue... is whether that omission prohibits
petitioner from qualifying under § 501 as an organization exempt from taxa-
tion.' -"
Once posited, the issue was easily resolved by the Court. Noting that "it
is a basic principle of statutory construction that a specific statute, here
subsection (e), controls over a general provision such as subsection (c)(3),
particularly when the two are interrelated and closely positioned .... the
Court found the legislative history of section 501 (e) dispositive. "It persuades
us that Congress intended subsection (e) to be exclusive and controlling for
cooperative hospital service organizations." 63 The Court's discussion of the
legislative history is unremarkable; it recounts episodically the 1968 enact-
ment of section 501(a), the failed effort to include laundry services in section
501(e)(l)(A), and the failed effort at amendment in 1976. On this basis the
Court in its peroration concluded:
In view of all this, it seems to us beyond dispute that subsection (e)(I)(A) of
§ 501, despite the seemingly broad general language of subsection (c)(3), specifies
the types of hospital service organizations that are encompassed within the scope
of § 501 as charitable organizations. Inasmuch as laundry service was deliberately
omitted from the statutory list and, indeed, specifically was refused inclusion in
that list, it inevitably follows that petitioner is not entitled to tax-exempt status. 64
Thus, with little imagination and more reliance on geography ("the two are
interrelated and closely positioned") than analysis, the Court accepted the
IRS position.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Legislative History of Section 501(e)
All the legislative history cited and discussed by the Court relates to and
amply demonstrates the fact that Congress did not intend the benefit of the
161. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. I, 6 (1981).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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section 501(e) exemption to be available to laundry service organizations.
When the Court says that "it inevitably follows that petitioner is not entitled
to tax-exempt status," 65 one is tempted to add: "under section 501(e)."
It cannot be denied that Congress' tentative treatment of the issues pre-
sented by the dispute over the tax-exempt status of HSOs makes the legisla-
tive history of section 50 1(e), and the subsection itself, unnecessarily ambigu-
ous. Therefore, this writer does not argue that the conclusion reached by the
Court, based on its reading of Congress' intentions, is categorically wrong:
when dealing with judicial interpretation of legislative intent-a notoriously
imprecise art'66-one must accept that ambiguous language is susceptible of
different interpretations. Nonetheless, it will be argued that the legislative
history of section 50 1(e), when read in conjunction with the policy considera-
tions behind the section, can support the conclusion that section 501(e) was
meant to be a "safe harbor" of exemption for HSOs. As Justice Stevens
noted in dissent, after a discussion of the history of the present state of the law
with respect to the tax status of cooperative HSOs, "When the statute is read
against [that] background-indeed, even when it is read in isolation-its plain
language unambiguously entitles this petitioner to an exemption. '67
1. The Underlying Policy Objective
One commentator, writing in 1975, said that "[s]ince its passage, § 501(e)
has remained in as much obscurity as it did in the committee reports."168
Indeed, as the divergent judicial interpretations attest, 169 the legislative his-
tory does not announce in unambiguous terms the precise purpose and role of
section 501(e). 70 Thus, to draw an inference of congressional ambivalence
toward HSOs from the legislative history alone is ill-advised. The purpose and
role of section 501(e) can be better ascertained in light of policy objectives
discerned broadly.
The policy objective that seems to have influenced Congress in its enact-
ment of section 501(e) is readily discerned. Congress sought by its enactment
to encourage the development of HSOs as a part of the effort to contain health
care costs. As stated in the report accompanying the Senate's first effort at
amendment:
A number of hospitals have formed organizations to perform various services such
as data processing, diagnostic laboratory services, laundering, purchasing, and
recordkeeping, etc., for the hospitals as a group. In addition, others desire to form
such organizations. The committee wishes to encourage the formation of such
165. Id.
166. See text accompanying notes 169-75 infra.
167. 450 U.S. 1, 9 (1981).
168. Tuthill, Qualifying As a Tax Exempt Cooperative Hospital Service Organization, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 448, 449 (1975).
169. See text accompanying notes 82-89, 129-39, and 147-50 supra.
170. Or as the Supreme Court noted in a different context: -[Mhe legislative history of [the] Act hardly
speaks with that clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to
enforce its will.** Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 483 (1951).
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joint service organizations because the performance of services in ajoint operation
can be expected to keep down the cost of hospital care, a matter of great concern
to your committee at the present time.' 7'
The same objective was reiterated in 1968 when the Senate proposed amend-
ment of section 501,172 which proposal was ultimately accepted. Again the
emphasis was on the "seriousness of the ever-rising cost of hospital care." 17
The overriding congressional policy objective was obviously the containment
of health care costs, a policy consistent with concerns being expressed both at
that time and later. 174
2. The Vitality of Hospital Bureau
The proponents of HSOs sought legislative amendment of section 501 in
order to make attainment of tax-exempt status easier in light of the IRS's
refusal to follow the Hospital Bureau holding.' 75 The Senate demonstrated its
awareness of the situation by acknowledging in a report that Hospital Bureau
was the "leading case in point."' 76 Moreover, the case was neither criticized
nor repudiated in that report, nor in any subsequent legislative report or
enactment. At the least, it can be inferred fromthe express acknowledgement
that Hospital Bureau was the "leading case in point" and from the reason-
ableness of its holding that Congress did not intend legislatively to overrule
that case.
The legislative history also contains references to the IRS position re-
garding the tax-exempt status of HSOs. The report in which Hospital Bureau
is acknowledged makes the following statement: "If two or more tax-exempt
hospitals join together in creating an entity to perform services for the hospi-
tals, the ... Service takes the position that the entity constitutes a 'feeder
organization' and is not entitled to income tax exemption. . . ."'77 One year
later, Senator Carlson, discussing the amendment that, with changes, became
section 501(e), said, "The proposed amendment ... is necessitated by the
inability of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service to find authority in
the present statute to grant the exemption required." 78 He then recounted the
tax problems encountered by HSOs and remarked that "unfortunately, tax
exemption is denied to the entity conducting the joint activity.' 79 Congress
knew of the IRS's position, but expressed neither approval of nor acqui-
171. S. REP. NO. 744,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 201, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2834,
3039-40.
172. 114 CONG. REC. 7516 (1968) (remarks ofSen. Carlson); id. at 8111-12 (remarks of Sen. Carlson & Sen.
Tydings).
173. See id. at 8111 (remarks of Sen. Carlson).
174. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
175. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
176. S. REP. NO. 774, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 201, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2834,
3039.
177. Id.
178. 114 CONG. REC. 7516 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Carlson).
179. Id.
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escence in it. Nor, it must be added, did Congress explicitly criticize it,
though Senator Tydings did refer at one point to "unforeseen rigidities in the
law," 8 0 a comment that may suggest that the IRS interpretation of section 502
differed to some degree from that entertained by Congress.
As noted, section 50 1(e) and the available evidence of Congress' intent in
enacting it are ambiguous. The exact purpose Congress intended section
501 (e) to serve is regrettably obscured by the atmosphere that surrounded its
enactment. But given the previously articulated congressional commitment to
measures that control the cost of health care, 8' it is plausible to argue the
continued vitality of Hospital Bureau and its rule that HSOs are within the
definition of section 501(c)(3). Absent congressional approval of the IRS posi-
tion, the Hospital Bureau decision, which, as noted above,' 82 was not ex-
pressly overruled, seems unaffected by the enactment of section 50 1(e). It can
stand, therefore, as an authoritative statement of the law in regard to the
tax-exempt status of HSOs under section 501(c)(3). As the Northern Cali-
fornia Central Services'83 court said, "[N]owhere in the legislative history of
§ 501(e) is there a reference to an intent to amend § 501(c)(3), or to alter the
then-present interpretation." 184 Justice Stevens makes the same point. He
argues that section 501(a) and 501(c)(3) contain no language to indicate that
section 501(e) was designed to limit their effect. Criticizing the Court for its
reliance on the spatial and topical proximity of sections 50 1(a), 501(c)(3), and
501(e) to conclude that the last limits the first two, he states:
Apart from their proximity to one another, the only express relationship between
these statutes is that certain entities described in § 501(e) are to be treated as
charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3) for federal income tax purposes. Noth-
ing in any of the relevant statutes suggests that § 501(e) is to have the effect of
denying an exemption to organizations that satisfy the requirements of § 501(c)(3).
When Congress wanted a statute to have such an effect, it had no difficulty making
its intention unmistakably plain, as is evident from § 501(a)'s reference to 88 502
and 503.185
The absence of such an intention to limit section 501(c)(3) can be laid to
180. Id. at 8112 (remarks of Sen. Tydings).
181. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 177-80 supra.
183. Northern Calif. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
184. Id. at 624.
185. 450 U.S. 1, 18 (1981). The court in Northern California Central Services drew the same conclusion:
When Congress passed the present § 501(e) in 1968, though, it did exclude shared laundry services from
its list of exempt service organizations, but made no attempt to alter Hospital Bureau of Standards'
interpretation of § 501(c)(3) or that section's applicability to shared laundry services, despite the
fact ... that the Congressmen were aware of HospitalBureau of Standards, and its holding. Thus, the
interpretation of § 50 I(c)(3) as rendered by this court in Hospital Bureau of Standards remains intact.
591 F.2d 620, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The Court of Claims' view that the enactment of § 501(e) does not nullify
the holding of Hospital Bureau accords with that courts' applicable precedent. The Court of Claims has
continued to give effect to preexisting judicial interpretations in areas where Congress has specifically legislated
but has not given clear indication that it intended to limit the effect of the judicial interpretation. See American
Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968); 1 S. WEITHORN, TAX TECHNIQUES FOR
FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 37.03, at 37-17; B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 149 n. 17 (3rd ed. 1979).
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sloppy draftsmanship-but that contention cuts in both directions. It may
have been careless of Congress not to declare clearly its intention to limit
section 501(c)(3) and Hospital Bureau, but it may also have been careless of
Congress to draft a statute that has the unintended effect of limiting section
501(c)(3).
B. Would a "Safe Harbor" Reading Render Section 501(e) Superfluous?
1. The Purpose of Section 501(e)
In view of the foregoing, one is left with the argument made expressly by
the Third Circuit in HCSC-Laundry86 and impliedly by the Court'87 that if
HSOs were already within section 501(c)(3), the enactment of section 501(e)
would have been superfluous. The rejoinder to this argument is straight-
forward: the enactment of section 501(e) was not superfluous because it was
compelled by the refusal of the IRS to follow the Hospital Bureau decision
holding HSOs exempt as charitable organizations. One commentator noted
that the principal disadvantage of section 501(c)(3) status was "simply the
difficulty in obtaining it," " owing, of course, to the IRS position. It can be
argued, therefore, that in view of the difficulties faced by HSOs in their quest
for tax-exempt status, Congress enacted section 501(e) to enable those per-
forming enumerated services to avoid prolonged and costly litigation by in-
voking its limited provisions-as to them it was certainly a safe harbor. This
argument is supported by Congress' treatment of the Hospital Bureau deci-
sion. Justice Stevens writes in his HCSC-Laundry dissent: "In my opinion §
501(e) unambiguously granted a tax exemption to certain entities that argu-
ably already were entitled to an exemption under § 501(c)(3). There is abso-
lutely no evidence that the 1968 statute was intended to withdraw any benefits
that were already available under the 1954 Act."' 89 He therefore suggests that
the proper question is whether the laundry service organization is exempt
under section 501(c)(3).'90
2. Statutory Construction
Nonetheless, the ambiguity, especially as to Hospital Bureau's fate,
lends weight to the Court's view that section 50 1(e) alone grants exemption to
HSOs on the ground that, as a matter of statutory construction, "a specific
statute, here subsection (e), controls over a general provision such as sub-
section (c)(3), particularly when the two are interrelated and closely posi-
tioned, both in fact being parts of § 501 relating to exemption of organizations
from tax."' 9'
186. 624 F.2d 428 ord Cir. 1980).
187. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. 1 R. BROMBERG, supra note 22, 9.2[2], at 9-5.
189. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 6.
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Justice Frankfurter once cautioned that rules of construction "give an air
of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact a delicate judgment,
concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive ele-
ments. " 192 In this regard, then, it must be noted that rules of construction
alone do not reveal and are not substitutes for congressional intent, although
they can put an "intellectually respectable gloss on decisions that are basi-
cally arbitrary choices among competing policies." 93 To conclude, as the
Court seemed to do, that section 501(e) narrows the scope of section 501(c)(3)
merely because the former is more specific than the latter, without-as Jus-
tice Stevens was quick to point out'4-citing any language to that effect in the
statute itself or in the legislative history, is to lend dubious substantive force
to a rule of statutory construction. By accepting this view the Court applies
principles of construction without regard to underlying circumstances and
legislative objectives.' 95 Niceties of statutory construction ought not be ap-
plied to defeat an overriding policy objective of Congress and the federal
government. 196
3. The Significance of the Exclusion of Laundry Services from Section 501(e)
Undue significance was attached by the Court to the exclusion of laundry
services from section 501(e). 197 The IRS had contended that the explicit con-
gressional action in 1968 and 1976 with respect to laundry service organiza-
tions and the efforts of various lobbies, including the American Hospital
Association, in seeking or preventing the amendment of section 501(e) pro-
vided ample indication that Congress did not intend to accord such organiza-
tions tax-exempt status. The Court said this "inevitably" led to the conclu-
sion that neither HCSC-Laundry nor any other laundry service organization
was entitled to an exemption. '
It is submitted that, except as it may be indicative of a more general and
otherwise unarticulated congressional purpose, the exclusion of laundry ser-
vices is irrelevant to a resolution of the question whether section 501(e) was
192. Frankfurter, Sone Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 544 (1947).
193. How the Supreme Court Reads Congress' Mind, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1981, § 4, at 8E, col. 1.
194. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute
merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court must do the merging,
and must in so doing take account of the policy of the statute-or else substitute its own version of
such policy. Creative reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable.
Llewellyn, Rentarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to
be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
196. See E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 176, at 284--85 (1940). The author notes:
"It has wisely been stated that the construction of statutes is 'eminently a practical science.' As a result, too
much reliance upon the various maxims or principles of interpretation may operate to defeat the legislative
intention rather than assist in its ascertainment and effectuation." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 544-45 (1947).
197. See text accompanying notes 162-65 supra.
198. 450 U.S. 1, 8 (1981). For the Court's language, see text at note 165 supra.
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intended to be a safe harbor. For the omission to affect section 501(c)(3), it
must be unambiguously established that Congress accepted the IRS position
that HSOs are section 502 feeder organizations and that Congress intended
thereby to reverse the Hospital Bureau holding that such organizations are
exempt under section 501(c)(3).' 99 As noted, neither possibility seems likely
upon examination of the legislative history.2° It is important not to impute to
each congressional act or omission broad policy implications where none was
intended. It is argued that the omission of laundry services from section 501 (e)
is one such instance.
In light of this caveat, it is important to place in perspective the implica-
tions of the IRS argument as ultimately adopted by the Court. The argument
in effect draws upon an isolated political phenomenon-the exclusion of
laundry services from section 501(e)-and attaches to that phenomenon an
ostensible legal and political significance that exaggerates its importance. To
argue from the narrow premise that Congress disfavored laundry service or-
ganizations by denying them specific legislative relief in order to reach the
conclusion that Congress intended therefore to deny them tax-exempt status
altogether, is to misconceive the political processes and policies underlying
congressional decision making. "The result," the Third Circuit in HCSC-
Laundry asserted, "reflects the political process in operation."- 20 , Nonethe-
less, it is within the province of the court to discern and interpret the signifi-
cance of relatively discrete products of the political process, not all of which
are of equal import. It is argued, therefore, that of itself the exclusion of
laundry services represents a narrow congressional decision based on com-
paratively insignificant political, not policy, considerations, and that the ex-
clusion should be read in this light. This is not to say that the initial congres-
sional decision to amend section 501 to allow for the specific exemption of
certain HSOs was not itself based on political considerations-it was. That is
the nature of a process by which policy decisions are made-through conflict
and negotiation among groups with varying interests. 2' 2 But unlike the deci-
sion to create subsection (e), the decision to exclude laundry services from
the ambit of the subsection was devoid of policy underpinnings independent
of the political considerations. The Court, in ascertaining congressional pur-
pose and intent, should have accounted for this distinction and read the omis-
sion as representing a limited amendment of the policy that compelled Con-
gress to act in the first instance. This is all the more true in view of the silence
in both section 501(e) and its legislative history regarding section 501(c)(3).
199. In his dissent in HCSC-Laundry, Justice Stevens also noted that the legislative history might support
the Court's position if it showed that "Congress in 1968 believed that cooperative hospital service organizations
were at least arguably entitled to tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) and it enacted § 501(e) to withdraw this
exemption from some, but not all, of these entities." 450 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1981).
200. See text accompanying notes 165-80 supra. See also HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. 624 F.2d 428, 435 (3rd Cir. 1980).
202. See Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy, and Judicial Review in the Anglo-
American Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHIO Sr. L.J. 69, 73 (1981).
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The District Court in HCSC-Laundry appreciated this: "In declining to in-
clude shared laundry service within the express exemption provisions of
§ 501(e) Congress was merely declining to become embroiled in a very sensi-
tive issue. 203 This view, it is argued, comports with the congressional policy
ascertained from section 501(e)'s legislative history2 4 and legislative enact-
ments concerned with health care.205
The judicially imposed significance given by the Supreme Court to the
narrow decision to exclude laundry services thus distorts the political power
of a parochial, insignificant special interest.206 The dangers of imputing exag-
gerated political leverage to special interests have long been recognized,0 7
but the Court in HCSC-Laundry nonetheless ignored political reality, over-
looked the critical distinction between policy determinations and short-lived
political concessions, and consequently chose not to give effect to a well-
defined policy to encourage the development of HSOs-including those per-
forming laundry services. '08
The Court's reliance on the inconclusive legislative history and the prin-
ciple of statutory construction betrays inadequate analysis. It is submitted
that given the paucity of congressional discussion of the purpose and effect of
section 501 (e), the Court should have considered and given decisive weight to
the policy considerations that underlay the issue by taking into account con-
gressional attitudes towards health care and its rising costs. If this were done,
particularly here where the result is not really "beyond dispute, ' '21 the issue
of the tax-exempt status of HSOs could have been resolved by reference to
the view that better serves the policy considerations-writ large-of Con-
gress, an approach preferable to the mechanical application of principles of
statutory construction. HSOs represent an institutional and structural reform
within the nonprofit hospital industry that militates toward greater cost-
efficiency without a concomitant decrease in the quality of care and therefore
comports with the broad policy of Congress. Every step should have been
taken to encourage them, including the step of ensuring their tax-exempt
status. This the Court declined to do. Instead it put the burden on Congress to
rewrite the law, glibly stating that Congress can change the result any time it
wants. 10 Perhaps judicial deference in requiring the legislature to clarify its
own ambiguities reflects a pragmatic approach to the issue. But, by such
undue deference in this situation, the Court bestows a political windfall upon
203. 473 F. Supp. 250. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf. Northern Cal. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d
620, 624-25 (Ct. CI. 1979). But see HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428, 434-35 (3rd Cir. 1980).
204. See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra.
205. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
206. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 624 F.2d 428, 435 (3rd Cir. 1980).
207. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see also, in a more current vein, Roberts,
Congressional Fear of Lobbies Evokes Mores to Make Hearings Less Visible, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1981, at 11,
col. 3.
208. But it must be noted that Congress did not help matters much.
209. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 8 (1981).
210. Id.
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a vocal lobby, without furthering the national effort to contain health care
costs.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout, references have been made to the policy considerations
underlying the issue of the tax-exempt status of HSOs. These considerations
do not exist merely in the abstract as well-intentioned but diffuse fulminations
emanating from Congress. Rather, they are products of substantial federal
legislation21 1 and national concern over the cost of health care.
A study2 1 2 conducted by the federal government asked the question:
"Can the upward trend in health costs be slowed by encouraging greater
efficiency in the health system's use of resources? 21 3 The answer is yes-
provided that the encouragement is the product of well-formulated policy that
is consistently and effectively applied. The nonprofit hospital industry's
unique relationship with the federal government and its isolation from institu-
tional and competitive pressures to contain costs indicate the need for a
consistent policy. 2'4 The position the Court has taken with respect to HSOs
prevents the total commitment of tax policy to the effort to control health care
costs. The Court's restrictive reading of sections 501(e) and 501(c)(3) will, as
did IRS's original antipathy, inhibit voluntary efforts of the nonprofit hos-
pital industry to effect institutional and organizational reforms that promise
much in the way of long-term cost containment.1 5
The cost can be great. In fiscal year 1980, for example, Americans spent
approximately $217.9 billion for personal health care, or $940.62 per capita, of
which hospital care accounted for $429.80.216 Health care expenditures con-
tinue to increase at a rate greater than the GNP. 2 7 Congress has remarked
that "[e]very saving will not only benefit the consumer directly but also the
Government, to the extent that health care costs are covered by Government
programs of payment, such as medicare and medicaid.- 2 8 To take the ob-
verse of this proposition, every increase in cost or failure to reduce costs
works to the detriment not only of the consumer directly, but also of the
21!. See, e.g., National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88
Stat. 2225, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e4, 300k-! to 300m-5, 30 0n to 300s-5, 300t (1975), as amended by the Health
Planning Resource Development Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592,42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-I to 300k-3,
3001-1 to 300n-l, 300n-3, 300n-5 to 300s-l, 300s-3, 300s-5 to 300t-14 (1979).
212. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HEALTH UNITED SrATES (1978).
213. Id. at 3-4.
214. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra. See also H. REP. NO. 538, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 32-33
(1967).
216. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Sept. 1931, at 1, 7,
20-21 (table 2A).
217. Price, Health Systems Agencies and Peer Review Organizations: Experiments in Regulating the
Delivery ofHealth Care, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY 359,362 (R. Roemer& G. McKray eds. 1980);
see note 16 supra.
218. S. REP. NO. 724, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076,
2086.
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goverment, that is, the tax-paying public, for whom "health care has come to
represent an increasingly crushing monetary burden .... ,,219 When tax
policy-in this instance made by the IRS and acquiesced in by the Supreme
Court-operates to inhibit the development and expansion of HSOs, especi-
ally laundry service organizations, it is not consonant with congressional
intent, whether viewed narrowly in terms of sections 501(c)(3), 501(e), or 502
or viewed broadly in terms of national health care policy.2 0
This counterproductive effect need not have occurred. The position
taken by the Supreme Court reflects neither an inevitable interpretation of
section 501(e) and its legislative history nor an accurate assessment of con-
gressional policy in the areas of tax and health care.
It appears, however, that the only alternative is reexamination of the
issue by Congress. This is an unfortunate result of administrative and judicial
rigidity in the interpretation of the tax laws, but one which could perhaps
eliminate the ambiguity of sections 501(c)(3) and 501(e) as they relate to the
tax-exempt status of HSOs and thereby remove an obstacle to the effort to
contain health care costs. Admittedly, some fault rests with Congress: it did
enact the law that, as interpreted, dealt only partially with the issue of the
tax-exempt status of the HSOs. But it must be emphasized that congressional
reexamination of the issue need not have been the inevitable resolution.
This Comment has sought to demonstrate that an analysis of section
50 1(e) as a safe harbor of exemption is indeed compatible with the law prior to
its enactment, the legislative history, and subsequent congressional action.
More important, perhaps, the analysis set forth is compatible with the under-
lying policy considerations. As the tax-exempt status of HSOs now stands, it
is up to Congress to rectify the succession of short-sighted interpretations of
the tax laws that resulted in the Court's decision in HCSC-Laundry.
Richard Mancino
219. Price, Health Systems Agencies and Peer Review Organizations: Experiments in Regulating the
Delivery of Health Care, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY 359, 362 (R. Roemer & G. McKray eds.
1980).
220. See notes 211 and 215 supra.
19811 1117

